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Abstract
Motivated by recent failures of polling to estimate populist party sup-
port, we propose and analyse two methods for asking sensitive multiple
choice questions where the respondent retains some privacy and therefore
might answer more truthfully. The first method consists of asking for
the true choice along with a choice picked at random. The other method
presents a list of choices and asks whether the preferred one is on the list
or not. Different respondents are shown different lists. The methods are
easy to explain, which makes it likely that the respondent understands
how her privacy is protected and may thus entice her to participate in the
survey and answer truthfully. The methods are also easy to implement
and scale up.
1 Introduction
When asking someone about a personal deed or preference one would expect
her to be less truthful, or willing to provide an answer, the more she thinks that
that deed or preference is illegal or shameful. This could be one of the reasons
many opinion polls have underestimated the public support for populist parties
and candidates in several countries in recent years. The concrete example that
motivates us is the larger than expected support for the Sweden Democrats
(SD), a nationalist party, in the Swedish general election 2014.
This phenomenon could work in two ways to skew the result of a poll. Firstly,
respondents may choose not to participate at all. This compounds the larger
problem of reaching a representative sample of the population. Secondly, the
respondents’ answers may be biased towards less sensitive preferences. In this
paper we suggest methods that let the respondents keep some privacy by intro-
ducing noise or asking for a less exact answer. Ideally this would affect both the
participation rate and the bias, but we only quantitatively analyse the possible
reduction in bias.
The issue of reaching a representative sample of respondents, due to both
demographic reasons and the sensitivity of the questions asked, has been raised
recently in the Swedish press [15]. For in-depth analysis of UK elections, see
[17, 18] that comment on possible problems with sensitive answers (“shy Tories”)
and also highlight the importance of using proper random samples.
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Our particular interest is in genuine multiple choice questions, i.e. where
the number of choices is larger than two. This is necessary in the context of
a parliamentary system with proportional representation such as the Swedish
one. In elections with a first-past-the-post system there are usually only two
dominating parties.
In the situation where there are only two choices of interest, say in an ef-
fectively two-party system, or when one wants to estimate a single proportion
in a population, e.g. the proportion that has committed a certain crime, there
are several methods to provide anonymity, such as the Randomised Response
Technique (RRT) introduced by [20].
In multiple choice situations this technique is not directly applicable, but
there are multiple choice extensions such as e.g. [1, 6], as well as other techniques
for scrambling data reported by the persons contributing to the poll which can be
found in e.g. [4] and the references therein. These methods can be perceived as
“weird” or hard to explain to the respondent due to the need of a complicated
randomisation device, that the respondents true answer is neglected, or that
unrelated questions are asked, see e.g. [12] and the references therein. This
also raises the concern that these types of methods will in practice be difficult
to implement on a sufficiently large scale, which is needed in the context of
assessing voting intentions in nationwide general elections.
This motivates the need for methods to handle polling of sensitive multiple
choice questions. The methods we describe focus on simple practical implemen-
tation. In particular the methods allows for (i) some degree of anonymity for
the respondent, (ii) simple or no randomisation device, (iii) simple questions
and (iv) the possibility of using automated surveys. Point (iv) is important,
since this implies that it is inexpensive to scale up the size of the survey.
We will introduce and analyse two methods which we call the “pair method”
and the “list method”. In the pair method, the respondent is asked to name her
party preference and another party chosen uniformly at random, and to reply
with both parties in random order. The randomisation is done privately by the
respondent. This method is similar to the methods of [7, 8]. For the list method,
the respondent is presented with a list of several parties and asked whether her
preferred party is on the list or not. Different respondents are presented with
different lists. As opposed to the pair method, the list method falls into the
category of “non-randomized” response techniques, see e.g. [19, 21].
The pair method provides anonymity since a respondent with the sensitive
preference will also reply with a non-sensitive one, so that from the point of
view of the interviewer she could also have had the non-sensitive preference as
her true preference and only responded with the sensitive one by chance. The
respondent has some plausible deniability. The list method provides even more
anonymity than the pair method if the presented lists contain more than two
parties. It is also easier to implement since it requires no randomisation by the
respondent.
The flip side of anonymity is that less information is gained from each re-
spondent and thus a larger sample is needed. The pair method is more efficient
than the list method in this regard. We analyse the methods both from the
perspective of the level of anonymity provided and the efficiency lost.
In the above argumentation we have only referred to “anonymity” in col-
loquial terms without defining this in more detail. Recall that for the simple
RRT introduced in [20] there is only a single sensitive answer in a dichotomous
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response situation. In [14] it was suggested that one could measure the degree of
anonymity in the RRT setting using a measure called “jeopardy”, which relates
to how much information is revealed concerning the sensitive answer. In the
present paper we discuss this measure in relation to the information theoretical
concept of entropy, see e.g. [11, 13, 16]. In particular we discuss the problem
with measures similar to jeopardy in the situation where, in the extreme case,
all answers may be regarded as sensitive. An example is that people may be
reluctant to reveal their true voting intention regardless of which political party
they will place their vote on.
The objective of the methods is to provide anonymity in order to reduce
bias. We therefore focus on unbiased estimators, which in our case turn out to
be maximum likelihood estimators. Even though we do not perform a Bayesian
analysis, it is worth noting that the measures of anonymity we use require some
reference to the distribution of preferences in the population, so that if one
wants to reason about the respondents’ perceived anonymity one must consider
their a priori views on this distribution. On the other hand, if you are reluctant
to specifying, or not interested in, the perceived level of privacy, no opinion
concerning the true a priori distribution of votes is needed.
Note that both suggested methods are very simple to explain to a respondent.
In the language of [12] we believe that the suggested methods provide low levels
of “weirdness”. Moreover, as opposed to standard RRTs the respondent will
always provide her true voting intention – this is important, not the least w.r.t.
the problem of getting respondents to participate at all, see e.g. [15, 17, 18]. That
is, if a pollster manages to contact a reluctant potential respondent we believe
that it is crucial that the respondent understands, at least intuitively, what is
meant with “anonymity” and that the respondent’s true intention is accounted
for. From a practical perspective we believe that the pair method probably
is more suitable to use either in face-to-face situations, since the pollster may
provide a suitable randomization device, e.g. a box with cards where all parties
are represented, or in a web based survey where the randomisation can be done
in the respondent’s browser. The list method, due to its yes/no character even
could be implemented using cell phone text messages (SMS) – “Would you
consider voting for any of the political parties in the list provided below? Please
reply to this text message with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.”. Moreover, the list method is
based on random sampling, and we believe it is inexpensive to implement using
automated surveys. This is an important feature w.r.t. the concerns raised in
[17, 18] on non-randomized sampling.
2 Measures of anonymity and information
2.1 Entropy, information, and privacy
We will introduce the concepts entropy and information. For more on these
topics see e.g. [16]. Let T be a discrete random variable with probability function
pT (t) := P[T = t], t ∈ T , and define its entropy by
H[T ] := −ET [log2 pT (T )] = −
∑
t∈T
pT (t) log2 pT (t).
The entropy measures the uncertainty about the outcome of T in the sense that
it gives bounds for the average number of yes/no-questions that are necessary to
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ascertain the outcome. The unit of measurement is called bit. More specifically,
with Q(T ) being the necessary number of dichotomous questions needed to
ascertain the outcome,
H[T ] ≤ E[Q(T )] < H[T ] + 1.
In our context, we think of T as the true voting intentions of a randomly chosen
respondent, i.e. the distribution of T has support on a set of political parties. If
the interviewer could only ask yes/no-questions of the kind “does your preferred
party belong to the set S” for different sets of parties S, then the expected
number of questions she would need would lie between H[T ] and H[T ] + 1.
From the definition of H[T ] it is also clear that its maximum is attained when
pT (t) = 1/|T | for all t ∈ T .
The respondent is afforded some degree of anonymity or privacy if she does
not have to divulge all information about her intentions, but rather retain some
bits of entropy. Let R be another discrete random variable having joint proba-
bility function pT,R(t, r) with T . We will think of R as the respondent’s answer
to the interviewer.
With pT |R(t | r) being the conditional probability function, we can define
the joint entropy
H[T,R] := −ET,R[log2 pT,R(T,R)],
the conditional entropy
H[T | R] := −ET,R[log2 pT |R(T | R)] = H[T,R]−H[R]
and the mutual information
I[T ;R] := H[T ] +H[R]−H[T,R] = H[T ]−H[T | R].
The entropy H[T ] then measures the interviewer’s uncertainty about the
voting intentions of a respondent before responding andH[T | R] the uncertainty
after having responded. The mutual information I[T ;R] measures how much
the uncertainty has decreased due to receiving an answer. In other words, the
conditional entropy H[T | R] measures the amount of retained privacy and the
mutual information I[T ;R] measures the amount of divulged information.
One can also note that I[T ;R] may be re-written according to
I[T ;R] =
∑
t∈T ,r∈R
pT,R(t, r) log2
pT,R(t, r)
pT (t)pR(r)
= DKL(pT,R || pT pR),
where DKL(F || G) corresponds to the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
probability distributions F and G, see e.g. [16, p. 34]. Further, it is clear that
DKL(F || G) ≥ 0, with equality iff F = G. Thus, I[T ;R] ≥ 0 and we only
have equality iff T and R are statistically independent, i.e. by knowing R no
information is gained w.r.t. T and vice versa. In our setting this corresponds to
complete anonymity and will never be possible to attain for the methods below.
In the case R = T , when the respondent tells the interviewer her precise
voting intentions, H[T,R] = H[T ] so that H[T | R] = 0 and there is no residual
uncertainty or privacy. Likewise I[T ;R] = H[T ], meaning all information has
been divulged.
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It must be noted that the measures of entropy and information are popula-
tion averages. The individual respondent might be more interested in− log2 pT (t),
which measures how uncommon her intention t is and how much information
about herself she would give away by revealing that. Likewise, she might only
want to participate in the survey if − log2 pT |R(t | r), measuring her retained
privacy, is high for all possible answers r that she might be prompted by the
survey design to give to the interviewer. This should be kept in mind when
designing the survey.
The description above also made the tacit assumption that the distribution
of T is common knowledge. If that were the case, the survey wouldn’t be needed
in the first place! In order to obtain unbiased answers it is important that the
respondents’ perceived privacy is protected to some extent, and that means that
one must consider the respondents’ subjective distributions of T , and possibly
their beliefs about the interviewer’s belief etc. There is no way to quantify these
subjective probabilities so we proceed pragmatically and assume that there is a
rough agreement in the population about the distribution of T .
The two proposed methods described in this paper are easily analysed within
this framework. Note that a single yes/no-question divulges at most one bit
since the entropy of a two-point distribution is less than or equal to one, with
equality in the case of equidistribution, as for a fair coin toss. Indeed, in the
pairs method, when each respondent provides her true voting intention together
with a randomly chosen other party, it only takes a single additional yes/no-
question to ascertain her true intention, viz. “is your true preference the first of
the two parties in the pair?” Therefore the retained privacy is at most one bit.
The list method is on the other side of the spectrum since it only asks a
single yes/no-question, and therefore the amount of divulged information is at
most one bit. If the lists are chosen to have support of close to half of the
population the divulged information is close to one bit.
2.2 Jeopardy
Above the concept of mutual information was introduced as a measure of how
much information about T is revealed by answering R. As will become clear later
on, we are mainly interested in situations where R may be seen as a function
of T . That is, given that a respondent’s voting preference is t its answer will
follow the distribution pR|T (r | t) for all r ∈ R, where R is the set of all possible
responses. Thus, if we let S be the set of sensitive or stigmatizing preferences,
it is clear that by applying Bayes’ theorem we get
pT |R(S | r)
pT |R(Sc | r) =
pR|T (r | S)
pR|T (r | Sc)
pT (S)
pT (Sc) ,
where
pT (A) :=
∑
t∈A
pT (t), A ⊂ T ,
and
pT |R(A | r) :=
∑
t∈A
pT |R(t|r), A ⊂ T ,
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which rephrased in terms of information by using log2 yields
log2
pR|T (r | S)
pR|T (r | Sc) = log2
pT |R(S | r)
pT |R(Sc | r) − log2
pT (S)
pT (Sc) , (1)
see e.g. [13, Eq. (2.3)]. The ratio on the left-hand side of (1) is what is called
jeopardy, which was introduced in [14]:
J(r) :=
pR|T (r | S)
pR|T (r | Sc) , P(T ∈ S ∪ S
c) = 1.
J(r) measures how much the unconditional odds have changed by answering
r, or, in other words, how much the respondent is jeopardized by answering
r. J(r) is therefore called the jeopardy with respect to S [14]. In [14] one
motivation for J(r) in the case with only a dichotomous sensitive question is
that J(r) is independent of the true population proportions pi, i.e. J(r) only
depends on the design probabilities of how responses are distributed given the
respondent’s position to the (single) sensitive answer. It is, however, important
to note that in the situation when there are more than one sensitive alternative,
J(r) will depend on the true underlying population proportions as well. Hence,
this situation applies to polling in political systems with more than two political
parties where respondents want to keep their vote secret.
Another interpretation of (1) is in terms of likelihood ratios, since T ∈ S or
T ∈ Sc may be seen as two different parametrisations of a probability law, see
e.g. [13, pp. 4–5]. Hence, (1) tells us how much information is revealed in favour
of T ∈ S opposed to T ∈ Sc when providing the response R = r.
Further, as noted above, J(r) is a measure of jeopardy for a single response.
In order to overcome this limitation it has been proposed in [5] to measure the
overall jeopardy of a survey design by averaging over the set R of all possible
responses, and to consider the quantity
J¯ :=
1
|R|
∑
r∈R
J(r).
Remark 1. Recall the information theoretic interpretation of I[T ;R] in terms
of Kullback-Leibler divergence and consider J¯ and J(r). A natural information
theoretic extension of J(r) for the situation with multiple sensitive answers is
to consider
ER|T∈S [log2 J(R)] = DKL(pR|T∈S || pR|T∈Sc) ≥ 0,
which corresponds to the mean information in favour of T ∈ S over T ∈ Sc
when assuming that T ∈ S. For more on this, see e.g. [13, Eq. (2.5), p. 5] and
the surrounding discussion.
2.3 Variance, bias and bias-detection in practice
In the case of elections a benchmark estimator p˜i for each party i is the one
obtained from fitting a binomial distribution, i.e. p˜i is the fraction of respondents
who say they will vote for party i:
np˜i ∼ Bin(n, pi − bi),
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where bi is the bias (
∑
i bi = 0).
Let pˆi be an unbiased estimator of pi, based on some anonymisation proce-
dure. One would expect that Var[pˆi] > Var[p˜i] when both estimators are derived
from samples of equal size, since the anonymity decreases the precision. How-
ever, this might be a price worth paying if anonomity produces a large enough
reduction.
We will now describe how we may use both pˆi and p˜i to detect bias in
practice. Let us for a moment assume that we may calculate Var[pˆi] as well as
obtain a Gaussian approximation of pˆi, we can calculate the power of the test
of {
H0: bi = 0
H1: bi > 0
based on the plug-in statistic
Ti(bi) :=
pˆi − p˜i − bi√
Varpˆi [pˆi] + Varp˜i [p˜i]
∼ asym. N(0, 1), (2)
given that the true bias is bi and where Varp[·] is calculated assuming the true
proportion is given by p. Note that the statistic Ti(bi) from (2) is only truly
computable in practice given that bi = 0. The asymptotic power of this test is
hence given by
piγ(bi) := P(reject H0 | H1)
= P(Ti(0) > zγ | H1 : bi > 0)
asym.
= 1− Φ(z1−γ − bi√
Varpˆi [pˆi] + Varp˜i [p˜i]
). (3)
Thus, by using (3) we can e.g. assess the size of n needed in order to obtain a
specific level of power to detect a certain level of bias.
An important remark concerning (3) is that piγ(bi) is a decreasing function
in
√
Varpˆi [pˆi] + Varp˜i [p˜i], which in itself typically is a decreasing function in
terms of pi. This, hence, implies that it ought to be easier to detect bias for
parties with few intended voters.
3 The multinomial distribution
Since it is easier to work with a multinomial distribution rather than a multivari-
ate hypergeometric distribution, we will assume that we poll with replacement
or that the population size is infinite. This is an innocuous assumption for
the applications we have in mind. We recall some well-known properties of the
multinomial distribution.
Let X = (X1, . . . , XN )
′ ∼ Mult(n,p) with p = (p1, . . . , pN )′ and
∑
k pk = 1
so that
P(X = x) =
(
n
x1, . . . , xN
)
px11 · · · pxNN
E[X] = np
Var[X] = n(diag(p)− pp′)
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To ease the notation we introduce V (p) := diag(p)− pp′. The maximum likeli-
hood estimator of p is
p˜ :=
1
n
X,
with
E[p˜] = p
Var[p˜] =
1
n
V (p) (4)
Let A(M,N) be the set of M × N matrices with non-negative elements and
column sums all equal to 1.
The different protocols we describe all have in common that we want to draw
inference about a vector of probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pN )
′ when the data comes
from a multinomial distribution Mult(n,u) with u = Ap for a known matrix
A, or more generally, when the data comes from independent multinomials
Mult(ni, Aip) for i = 1, . . . , L. We need Ai ∈ A(Mi, N) so that ui is a vector
of probabilities.
Lemma 1. Let Xi = (Xi1, . . . , XiKi) ∼ Mult(ni,ui) independently for i =
1, . . . , L, with ui = Aip for given Ai ∈ A(Ki, N) and αi := ni/n where n =∑
i ni. Denote by
A :=
α1A1...
αLAL
 and X¯ :=
X1...
XL
 .
If A has rank N , then
pˆ :=
1
n
(A′A)−1A′X¯ (5)
is an unbiased estimator of p with variance
Var[pˆ] =
1
n
(A′A)−1
( L∑
i=1
α3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A′A)−1. (6)
In the case L = 1 with A := A1 and n := n1, pˆ =
1
nA
+X1 and
Var[pˆ] =
1
n
(
(A′A)−1A′ diag(Ap)A(A′A)−1 − pp′).
See Section A for proof of this Lemma.
Note that the definition of pˆ from (5) is very natural w.r.t. u = Ap, since
pˆ is merely the standard least squares regression coefficient estimator of p.
Moreover, due to this interpretation it is reasonable that the variance of pˆ
will also average out deviations between observations relating to individual pi’s
— manifested by the multiplication from left and right by (A′A)−1, which is
a global quantity affecting all components of p. That is, given that we do
not obtain direct observations of individual pi’s, which in our situation is a
consequence of anonymisation, poor precision relating to one component of p
will to some degree contaminate the remaining estimators’ precision as well.
Also note that pˆ is a linear transformation of X¯ and hence there is no guarantee
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that pˆi is non-negative for all i. Still, it is important to note that since X¯/n
is a maximum likelihood estimator of Ap it follows that the above pˆ is an ML
estimator of p.
Further, given Lemma 1 it is reasonable to expect that there exists a corre-
sponding central limit theorem, which there is:
Lemma 2. Let pˆ be defined according to Lemma 1. Assume that
αi =
ni
n
→ α˜i > 0, as ni, n→∞,
for all i such that
∑
i α˜i = 1 and denote
A˜ :=
 α˜1A1...
α˜LAL
 .
Then
√
n(pˆ− p) D→ G, as n, ni →∞, for all i,
where G is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance
Var[G] = (A˜′A˜)−1
( L∑
i=1
α˜3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A˜′A˜)−1.
The proof of Lemma 2 is based on a standard central limit theorem for the
multinomial Xis, which combined with Slutsky’s theorem and a general version
of the continuous mapping theorem which provides convergence for sequences
of mappings yields the desired result. A detailed proof is given in Section A.
4 Introducing two new anonymised survey meth-
ods with open answers: The Pair method and
the List method
4.1 Pair method
Consider the following polling protocol: each individual participating in the poll
is asked to name the party she intends to vote for together with an additional
party chosen uniformly at random amongst the remaining N − 1 parties. The
answers are reported unordered, i.e. the interviewer does not know which party
is the true vote intention.
Note that we here assume that there is only a single sensitive party to vote
for. That is, it should not be possible to obtain a voting pair {i, j} where both
parties are regarded as being sensitive. We will return to this situation when
we discuss the list method.
The possible answers are the M :=
(
N
2
)
= N(N−1)2 unordered pairs {1, 2},{1, 3}, . . . , {N − 1, N} = P1, . . . , PM . When we need to order all pairs we
always use this lexicographic ordering, i.e. {i, j}, where i < j. Let bik = 1 if
i ∈ Pk and bik = 0 otherwise.
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Assuming that the true voting intentions have the frequencies p1, . . . , pN ,
the probability of receiving the answer {i, j} is given by
uij := pi
1
N−1 +
1
N−1pj =
1
N−1 (pi + pj)
since either i or j must be the true intention with respective probability pi and
pj , and in either case the random choice, j and i respectively, has probability
1
N−1 . If the poll size is n and Xij is the number of answers {i, j}, then clearly
X = (X12, X13, . . . , XN−1,N )′ ∼ Mult(n,u) with u := (u12, u13, . . . , uN−1,N )′.
The ML estimator for u is uˆ := 1nX. This can be used to derive an unbiased
estimator of p, since we can re-write u = Ap, where A is the N ×M matrix
defined according to:
A :=
1
N − 1B
′ =
1
N − 1

1 1 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 1
 ,
where Bik = bik with bik given as above. That is, by using the above definition
of A it is clear that Lemma 1 applies to the pair method, which yields the
following explicit result:
Theorem 1. The estimator
pˆi :=
N − 1
N − 2
∑
j
uˆij − 1
N − 2 (7)
is an unbiased estimator of pi, i = 1, . . . , N , with
Var[pˆi] =
1
n
(
1 + (N − 3)pi
(N − 2) − p
2
i
)
(8)
Cov[pˆi, pˆj ] = − 1
n
(
1− pi − pj
(N − 2)2 + pipj
)
, i 6= j. (9)
A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section A.
4.2 List method
If there are two sensitive choices, the pair method will for some respondents
produce an answer with both those choices. To reintroduce some deniability, the
method could be extended to triples so that each true preference is accompanied
by two random choices. If there are three sensitive choices, one could ask for
quadruples, and so on. This quickly becomes unwieldy.
Instead of asking the respondent to produce a list of several parties, where
one is the true preference and all other are random, the interviewer might simply
show a list of parties and ask if the respondent’s preference is on the list or not.
If the interviewer picks lists from a well-constructed set of lists, it is possible
to derive an estimate of the population preferences. We will shortly describe
what we mean with “well-constructed”. Note that we assume a fixed set of N
possible choices so that a no-answer means that the preferred party must be on
the complementary list of parties.
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If the respondent answers truthfully, the probability of a yes-answer is ui :=∑
k∈L+i pk when she is presented with a list L
+
i . We can put this in the notation
of Section 3 if we let Ai be a 2×N matrix with elements a1k = 1{k ∈ L+i } and
a2k = 1{k /∈ L+i }, so that ui = (ui, 1− ui)′ = Aip and the number of (yes, no)
answers from asking ni people about the list L
+
i is Mult(ni,ui). Note that the
first row of Ai codes for membership in the list L
+
i and the second codes for
membership in the complementary list L−i := {i : i /∈ L+i } = {1, . . . , N} \ L+i .
In order to apply Lemma 1 we need the matrix A that stacks all L matrices
A1 to AL for the lists L
+
1 to L
+
L to have rank N , i.e. the space spanned by its
N column must have full dimension N . This is what we mean with a “well-
constructed” set of lists.
In order to see how this can be done in practice, let us consider the case
with N = 4, the first situation which provides anonymity when there is only a
single sensitive alternative, by constructing lists with two parties in each. That
is, we have
(
N
2
)
= 6 such combinations of L+i and L
−
i , i.e. 3 lists in total, which
stacked gives us
A :=
α1A1α2A2
α3A3
 =

α1 α1 0 0
0 0 α1 α1
α2 0 α2 0
0 α2 0 α2
α3 0 0 α3
0 α3 α3 0
 , where αi > 0 and
∑
i
αi = 1.
A has full column rank (= 4). Thus, we can write u = Ap and Lemma 1 applies,
which directly gives us that pˆ given by (5) is an unbiased estimator of p together
with computational formulas for the estimator’s covariance.
Consequently, in the general situation, if we have a well-constructed set, the
estimator pˆ defined in Equation (5) is unbiased and has variance given by (6).
We can compare this variance with that of the ordinary ML-estimate of p for
some different sets of lists. As N grows the number of well-constructed sets
grows exponentially.
One idea is to construct lists with a priori voting support close to 50 %
(maximize anonymity) or with, as close to, equally many parties on all lists
(low weirdness). Another criterion used to choose lists could be to minimise
the variance. Note that all these possibilities amounts to choosing the αi’s in a
certain way. Here one can also note that the αi’s allow for ex post calibration
of potential non-response. In order to avoid too many subjective choices we will
from now on primarily focus on the situation where we use all
(
N
bN/2c
)
possible
lists with (close to) equally many parties on each list and its complementary
list.
An interesting result with an even number of parties is the following:
Proposition 1. Let N = 2M be even and the set of lists include all L =(
N−1
M−1
)
=
(
N
M
)
/2 lists with M parties that include party one, so that the set of
complementary lists also cover M parties each, and all exclude party one. The
lists and complementary lists then cover all
(
N
M
)
=
(
N
N/2
)
combinations of half
of the N parties. Further, assume that αl =
1
L for all l. Then all estimators pˆi
of the list method have the same variance.
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The value of the common variance depend on the true p, but it is still
remarkable that one can get a common margin of error for all parties.
4.3 On relations to other methods
Let us consider the pair method when there is only a single sensitive answer.
Assume that our aim is to maximize the plausible deniability of this sensitive
voting intention, belonging to party 1, say. Given any answer r1j we could
consider replacing the uniform probability with which your true voting intention
is paired with an anonymising scrambling vote. Let piij denote the probability
that you add j as a possible voting preference to your answer given that your true
voting intention is i. A partial analog of a standard Forced Response Technique,
see [3], is obtained by setting pii1 ≡ 1, i 6= 1, and let pi1j ∈ [0, 1],
∑
j pi1j = 1.
That is, given that your true voting intention is 1 you add another possible
voting preference j according to pi1j , but if your true voting intention is i 6= 1
you will always, i.e. you are “forced” to, add the sensitive voting alternative
1 to your response. Thus, given this mechanism for producing response pairs,
you may only give an answer in the set {1, j}, j = 2, . . . , N . It is, however, also
clear from construction that this is only a reasonable method given that there is
exactly one sensitive voting preference. Moreover, the choice of piij still remains.
Given no a priori knowledge of pi a natural choice of pi1j is still pi1j = 1/(N−1),
see also the discussion on entropy in Section 2.1 and 5.1.
One may also note that the pair method coincides with the “Equiprobable
Design Matrix” method in [8], although their definition of the method is in some
sense complementary. That is, the pair method in their setting corresponds to
choosing N − 2 parties uniformly at random amongst those not containing the
true voting intention. Hence, the remaining set which is not chosen contains
two parties where one is the true voting intention together with an additional
vote. On the other hand, this additional vote can due to exchangeability be
seen as chosen uniformly at random amongst the N − 1 parties not containing
the true vote.
The same method from [8] covers answering with n-tuples with n−1 random
choices added to the true preference.
5 Evaluation of the Pair method and the List
method: entropy, anonymity, bias and real-
world examples
We will now apply the theory from Section 2 on the pair method and the list
method. Focus will be on results and conclusions which can be drawn from these
– all derivations are given in the appendix. We will, when relevant, provide ana-
lytical expressions, but also numerical expressions for the situation when the true
voting intention is uniform, i.e. pi = 1/N for all i, as well as pi corresponding
to the general election in Sweden in 2014. The reason for analysing the situ-
ation with uniform voting preferences is that this situation will have maximal
entropy, i.e. H[T ] = log2N , and hence have maximal anonymity. Moreover,
in the Swedish general election of 2014 the voting preference of the Sweden
Democrats (SD) turned out to be the hardest to estimate correctly. Due to
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this our numerical illustrations for measures of privacy will be w.r.t. to SD. The
outcome of the Swedish general election from 2014 is given in Table 1. For
the numerical illustrations we use equally balanced lists, i.e. a design with all
lists that have 5 choices out of the possible 10. Thus, the number of lists and
complementary lists is
(
10
5
)
= 252.
5.1 Entropy
All entropy calculation for the pair and the list method are given in Table 2
for easy reference. To start off, recall that I[T ;R] is the expected reduction in
uncertainty of T due to knowledge of R. Due to construction, we expect that the
pair method will disclose more information than the list method. By inspecting
the results in the situation with equal voting preferences it is seen that the pair
method only retains a single bit of information given an answer whereas the list
method only reveals one bit. This is reasonable, since given that a respondent
answers truthfully it is clear that the true voting intention is contained in the
pair with which she has answered. Thus, a single yes/no question remains in
order to fully disclose the respondents true voting preference. Concerning the
list method it is on the other hand clear that very little information will be
revealed when providing the yes/no answer to a specific list – corresponding to
revealing a single bit. This argumentation also explains the remaining measures
listed in Table 2 in the case with uniformly distributed voting intentions.
If we instead turn to Table 3, where the true voting intentions are not uni-
formly distributed, it is seen that for the pair method very little information
about the true voting intention is retained given an answer. This is perhaps not
surprising given the discussion above, but it is interesting to see that the least
anonymity contained when the true voting intention is SD is approximately 0.1
bits, when SD is paired with the answer “O” corresponding to “Other parties”.
Concerning the list method, we see that the situation is similar, but still more
information is retained as a consequence of that all lists contain 5 out of 10
parties.
5.2 Jeopardy
From Table 4 it is clear that both J(r) and J¯ are greater than or equal to one
for both methods. This is easily seen for the pair method, assuming 1 ∈ r, since
J(r) =
1− p1
pj
=
pj +
∑
k 6∈{1,j} pk
pj
≥ 1,
and the same argument applies to the other expressions as well. Thus, from
the definition of jeopardy this tells us that an answer will increase the odds of
the respondent to actually have the sensitive voting preference. Moreover, from
Table 4 we see that for the situation with uniform voting preferences the pair
method will reveal more information about the true voting intention than the
list method – in agreement with the results on entropy.
If we instead consider the situation corresponding to the Swedish general
election from 2014, i.e. Table 5, we see that the same ordering of the methods
w.r.t. J¯ remains. Again, the sensitive vote is taken to be the Sweden Democrats
(SD). One can also note that the pair method performs much worse than the
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list method in this situation. It is, however, less clear how to value a deviation
from 1 as opposed to the entropy measures which have a natural scale in terms
of bits.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the original introduction of jeopardy from [14]
in the yes/no situation was possible to express in terms of “design” probabilities
– subjectively chosen probabilities which defines the randomization procedure
being used. From Table 4 we see that this clearly is not the case for the pair
and the list method, since both J(r) and J¯ depend on the true underlying
voting intentions. Given this we believe that the entropy measures introduced
above, which also depend on the true voting preferences, are closer to what a
respondent is truly interested in. Due to this, we recommend that the entropy
measures should be used instead of jeopardy in the present situation.
5.3 Variance and bias
Assuming no bias, bi = 0, then p˜i := Xi/n is the standard unbiased ML es-
timator of pi assuming a direct response survey in an infinite population, i.e.
Xi ∼ Bin(n, pi), with Var[p˜i] = 1npi(1 − pi). Note that the variance of pˆi for
the pair method from (8) above may be re-written according to
Var[pˆi] =
1
n
pi(1− pi) + 1
n(N − 2)(1− pi)
= Var[p˜i] +
1
n(N − 2)(1− pi)
> Var[p˜i],
as anticipated, since pˆi is based on anonymised information which results in lack
of precision compared to p˜i.
Although the list method has computable (co)variances, it is in general not
possible to obtain closed form expressions for a particular voting intention unless
additional simplifying assumptions are made. In Table 6 this is done for the
case with uniform voting intentions. Compared with the results on entropy
and jeopardy above, we see that the pair method here will outperform the list
method. This is not surprising, since, as seen above, the pair method will
disclose more information – information which contributes to inference. In the
situation when the true voting intentions are uniformly distributed with N = 10
Table 6 implies that the variance for the list method is 4 times higher than for
the pair method and we see that the ratio between the baseline variance w.r.t.
p˜i and the pair method is 0.44 whereas the same ratio for the list method is only
0.11. The latter corresponds to that the pair method’s variance is approximately
2 times higher than the baseline variance and the corresponding figure for the
list method is 9 times higher.
When we consider the Swedish general election from 2014 in more detail we
will focus on the Sweden Democrats (SD – sensitive), the the Social Democrats
(S – largest) and those voting for “other” (O) less established parties (smallest).
First, note that since the Swedish general election contains N = 10 different
choices the list method will have constant variance — which is not the case for
the pair method and the benchmark binomial method. In Figures 2, 3 and 4
we see that for the list method we need to have a sample size of approximately
n = 8 000 in order to have a standard deviation of 1%, i.e. a 95% confidence
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interval with width of 3.9%, and need a sample size of approximately n = 15 000
in order to reduce the standard deviation to 0.75% (95% confidence width of
2.9%). Also note that the standard deviation for the list method is the same
in all three figures. From the same figures we see that we need approximately
n = 5 000− 12 000 in order for the pair method to have a standard deviation of
0.5%, noting that the standard deviation for the pair method (and the baseline
binomial) differs between the figures.
Further, if we turn to calculating power, piγ(bi), following (3), we need to
decide on the total survey size together with how many we should allocate to
the standard direct poll and how many which should be allocated to answer
according to the list or the pair method. In all analyses we use a total survey
size of n = 15 000 chosen based on the above variance discussions and use the
two alternatives for allocation: (i) nList = nPair = 13 500 and (ii) use allocations
which are optimised w.r.t. piγ(bi) under the null-hypothesis bi = 0, that is we
choose n• according to
n• = n
√
Varpˆ[pˆ]√
Varpˆ[pˆ] +
√
Varp˜[p˜]
,
where n• corresponds to either the list or the pair method. Moreover, in all
calculations we have used the confidence level (type I error) γ = 5%.
By comparing Figure 5 with Figure 6, and Figure 7 with Figure 8, we see
that there is a substantial gain in power when using the optimised allocation
between the types of surveys. At 90% power the difference in detectable bias in
the support for SD is approximately 1 percentage point for the pair method and
0.5 percentage points for the list method. For the optimised allocation (Figure
8) it is possible to detect bias which is slightly less than 2 percentage points with
the pair method and 3 percentage points with the list method, at 90% power.
In the days before the Swedish general election in 2014 most large opinion polls
underestimated the SD support by 2 to 3 percentage points, see e.g. [9].
6 Concluding remarks
The present paper is concerned with methods on how to openly ask multiple
choice questions where at least one alternative is seen as sensitive and where a
response does not fully divulge the respondent’s true position to the question
asked. In order to do so we have presented two methods, the “pair method”
and the “list method”, which both rely on the idea that a response is defined in
terms of a subset of all possible choices which still contains the respondent’s true
choice. This provides the respondent with plausible deniability if the sensitive
answer(s) is contained in the subset of choices which defines its response. The
degree of anonymity which is obtained in this way is possible to quantify in
terms of both entropy related measures of privacy and in terms of “jeopardy”
measures. Using these measures it is possible to communicate the degree of
anonymity which is retained when participating in this type of survey.
Further, for both methods we have derived unbiased estimators of the true
underlying population proportions which belong to the different categories of
choices, together with expressions for the estimators’ variances as well as central
limit theorems. Moreover, these results also allows us to make power calculations
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w.r.t. detection of possible bias in responses when compared with standard direct
survey methods.
As discussed in the introduction, our main motivation for this research topic
is the recently observed problems in estimating voting intentions in general
elections. In particular, the problem of correctly estimating the population pro-
portion which will vote for populist parties/candidates. Due to this context, we
believe that it is crucial that an anonymised survey method, apart from allow-
ing for an anonymised responses, does not rely on complicated randomisation
devices, is based on simple questions and allows for automated survey proce-
dures. The methods introduced in the present paper allows for this. Moreover,
by providing anonymity we believe that the introduced methods should be able
to reduce response bias. Still, the reduction in the estimators’ precision, due
to anonymisation, is possible to compensate for by increasing the sample size,
which could be done inexpensively using automation. It is also worth to stress
that both methods are based on random sampling — the use of non-randomised
sampling techniques is one of the explanations for poor performance given in
the post-election analyses given in [17, 18].
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A Proofs
Let 1 be a column vector of ones whose length depends on the context, JM,N
be an M × N matrix of ones, and let Mn(a, b) be the n × n matrix with all
diagonal elements equal to a and all off-diagonal elements equal to b: Mn(a, b) :=
(a− b)I + bJn,n. We will sometimes write A+ for (A′A)−1A since the latter is
the Moore-Penrose inverse of A when A has full column rank.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first note that A has dimensions (
∑
iKi) × N so full
(column) rank means having rank N and in particular (A′A)−1 is well-defined.
Since theXi’s have expected value E[Xi] = niui = nαiAip and are independent
with covariance matrices nV (Aip) = nαiV (Aip) we have
E[X¯] = nAp
Var[X¯] = n
α1V (A1p) 0. . .
0 αLV (ALp)

so that
E[pˆ] =
1
n
(A′A)−1A′E[X¯] = (A′A)−1A′Ap = p,
Var[pˆ] =
1
n2
A+Var[X¯]A+′
=
1
n
(A′A)−1A′
α1V (A1p) 0. . .
0 αLV (ALp)
A(A′A)−1
=
1
n
(A′A)−1
( L∑
i=1
α3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A′A)−1.
In the case L = 1, the variance of the estimator is
Var[pˆ] =
1
n
(A′A)−1A′V (Ap)A(A′A)−1 =
1
n
(
(A′A)−1A′ diag(Ap)A(A′A)−1 − pp′).
(10)
Proof of Lemma 2. We want to prove a central limit theorem for
pˆ =
1
n
(A′A)−1A′X¯,
and will start by proving a central limit theorem for X¯. Recall that Xi ∼
Mult(ni,ui) which gives us that
uˆi :=
1
ni
Xi
is an unbiased estimator of ui = Aip with covariance V (Aip)/ni. From e.g. [2,
Thm. 14.3-4] it then follows that
√
ni(
1
ni
Xi −Aip) = √ni(uˆi − ui) D→ Ui, as ni →∞,
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where Ui is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance V (Aip). Thus,
if
αi =
ni
n
→ α˜i ≥ 0, as ni, n→∞,
for all i such that
∑
i α˜i = 1 it follows, due to Slutsky’s theorem, that
√
n(
1
n
Xi − αiAip) = √αi√ni(uˆi − ui) D→ U˜i, as ni, n→∞,
where U˜i is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance α˜iV (Aip).
Hence, if we stack all Xi in X¯ as before, it follows, due to independence between
the Xis, that
√
n(
1
n
X¯i −Ap) D→ U˜, as ni, n→∞, for all i,
where U˜i is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance
Var[U˜ ] =
α˜1V (A1p) 0. . .
0 α˜LV (ALp),

by the same arguments as those used in the proof of Lemma 1. Thus, we have
obtained a central limit theorem for X¯.
Continuing, note that we may re-write
pˆ =
1
n
(A′A)−1A′X¯ = hn(
1
n
X¯)
where
hn(x) := (A
′A)−1A′x ∈ RN×1
for x ∈ R(
∑
iKi)×1. Moreover, given that
αi =
ni
n
→ α˜i ≥ 0, as ni, n→∞,
for all i such that
∑
i α˜i = 1 it is clear that
A→ A˜, as ni, n→∞, for all i,
and that
(A′A)−1A′ → (A˜′A˜)−1A˜′.
Consequently, it follows that
hn(x)→ h(x), as ni, n→∞, for all i,
which together with [10, Thm. 3.27] yields
√
n(pˆ− p) = hn(
√
n(
1
n
X¯ −Ap)) D→ h(U˜) = (A˜′A˜)−1A˜′U˜ ,
where G := (A˜′A˜)−1A˜′U˜ is multivariate Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance
Var[G] = (A˜′A˜)−1
( L∑
i=1
α˜3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A˜′A˜)−1,
which concludes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 1. As noted above, we can write u = Ap, where A = 1N−1B
′
and B is the N ×M matrix with elements bik as defined above:
A :=
1
N − 1

1 1 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 1

Since A has rank N , we can use Lemma 1 with L = 1 to derive an unbiased
estimator of p, and we will in fact show that the pˆ of the Theorem equals that
of the Lemma, i.e. that pˆ of the Theorem equals A+uˆ. We claim
A+ =
N − 1
N − 2B −
1
N − 2JN,M . (11)
To prove (11), it is sufficient to show that A+A = I. First note that JK,MA =
JK,N since A ∈ A(M,N) and thus 1′A = 1′. Also note that BB′ is a matrix
with all diagonal elements equal to N − 1 and all off-diagonal elements equal to
1, i.e.
BB′ = (N − 2)I + JN,N . (12)
Therefore,
A+A =
(
N − 1
N − 2B −
1
N − 2JN,M
)
A
=
N − 1
N − 2BA−
1
N − 2JN,N
=
1
N − 2BB
′ − 1
N − 2JN,N
= I,
and we have thus shown that (11) holds. Since uˆ is a vector of probabilities,
JN,M uˆ = 1, and
A+uˆ =
(
N − 1
N − 2B −
1
N − 2JN,M
)
uˆ =
N − 1
N − 2Buˆ−
1
N − 21 = pˆ,
where the right hand side is defined in (7). By Lemma 1, pˆ is an unbiased
estimator of p.
It remains to show that (10) specializes to (8) and (9) in our case. We see
that it suffices to show that A+ diag(Ap)A+′ has diagonal elements (1 + (N −
3)pi)/(N−2) for i = 1, . . . , N and off-diagonal elements −(1−pi−pj)/(N−2)2.
In general, when a matrix E with elements eij , i, j = 1, . . . , N , is defined
as the product E := C diag(d)C ′ where C has elements cij for i = 1, . . . , N ,
j = 1, . . . ,M and d = (d1, . . . , dM )
′, then
eij =
∑
k
dkcikcjk. (13)
We use equation (13) with d = Ap = 1N−1 (p1 + p2, . . . , pN−1 + pN )
′ = 1N−1B
′p
and
C = A+ =
1
N − 2
(
(N − 1)B − JN,M
)
.
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Equation (11) means that A+ has elements (A+)ik =
1
N−2
(
(N − 1)bik − 1
)
= 1.
Element k of Ap = 1N−1B
′p is 1N−1
∑
l plblk.
For the diagonal elements we get(
A+ diag(Ap)A+′
)
ii
=
∑
k
dkc
2
ik
=
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblk
(
(N − 1)bik − 1
)2
{b2ik = bik} =
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblk
(
(N − 1)(N − 3)bik + 1
)
=
N − 3
(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblkbik +
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblk
{by (12) and def. of B} = N − 3
(N − 2)2
(
(N − 2)pi +
∑
l
pl
)
+
1
(N − 2)2
∑
l
pl
=
1 + (N − 3)pi
N − 2 ,
which is what we want. We proceed with the off-diagonal elements with i 6= j.(
A+ diag(Ap)A+′
)
ij
=
∑
k
dkcikcjk
=
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblk
(
(N − 1)bik − 1
)(
(N − 1)bjk − 1
)
=
N − 1
(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblkbikbjk − 1
(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblkbik
− 1
(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblkbjk +
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)2
∑
k,l
plblk
=
N − 1
(N − 2)2 (pi + pj)−
1
(N − 2)2
(
(N − 2)pi + 1
)
− 1
(N − 2)2
(
(N − 2)pj + 1
)
+
1
(N − 2)2
= −1− pi − pj
(N − 2)2 ,
and the proof is done.
Proof of Proposition 1. We will apply Lemma 1 and make the expression in (6)
more explicit, at least with regards to the diagonal of the covariance matrix.
Note that
Mn(a, b)Mn(c, d) = Mn
(
ac+ bd(n− 1), ad+ bc+ bd(n− 2))
and thus
Mn(a, b)
−1 = Mn
(
a+ b(n− 2)
(a− b)(a+ b(n− 1)) ,
−b
(a− b)(a+ b(n− 1))
)
(14)
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provided a 6= b and a 6= −b(n−1). For the special case Jn,n = Mn(1, 1) we have
Mn(a, b)Jn,n = Mn(a+ b(n− 1), a+ b(n− 1)) = (a+ b(n− 1))Jn,n. (15)
With A the matrix defined in Lemma 1:
A := α
A1...
AL
 =: αA¯.
The 2L×N matrix A¯ codes with ones for membership of a party in each of the
2L lists and complementary lists, and has zeros for non-membership.
The matrix A′A = α2A¯′A¯ =: α2B where the elements of B = (bij) count
the number of lists and complementary lists that include both party i and j.
Since the lists and complementary lists include all combinations of N/2 out of N
parties and each party is included in half of the combinations, bii =
(
N
N/2
)
/2 = L
and bij =
(
N−2
N/2−2
)
= LN/2−1N−1 for i 6= j. In other words, we have
A′A = α2MN
(
L,L
N/2− 1
N − 1
)
= αMN
(
1,
N/2− 1
N − 1
)
with inverse, by (14),
(A′A)−1 = 2LMN
(
1− 2(N − 1)
N2
,−N − 2
N2
)
.
Observe that, by equation (15) and the matrices being symmetric,
(A′A)−1JN,N = JN,N (A′A)−1 =
1
N
JN,N . (16)
Since Aip = (p
+
i , p
−
i )
′, where p◦i :=
∑
k∈L◦i pk for ◦ = +,−, we have
V (Aip) = p
+
i p
−
i
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
=: qi
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
= qi(2I − J2,2),
where we defined qi := p
+
i p
−
i . Now
A′iV (Aip)Ai = qi(2A
′
iIAi −A′iJ2,2Ai) = qi(2A′iAi − JN,N ) = qiCi,
where the matrix Ci has equal number of 1’s and −1’s on each row and column.
For such a matrix, CiJN,N = JN,NCi = 0, where 0 := 0JN,N is the zero matrix,
and thus
MN (a, b)CiMN (a, b) = Mn(a, b)Ci
(
(a− b)I + bJN,N
)
= (a− b)MN (a, b)C
= (a− b)((a− b)I + JN,N)Ci = (a− b)2Ci.
We can write equation (6)
Var[pˆ] =
1
n
(A′A)−1
( L∑
i=1
α3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A′A)−1
=
4
nL
L∑
i=1
qiMN
(
1− 2(N − 1)
N2
,−N − 2
N2
)
CiMN
(
1− 2(N − 1)
N2
,−N − 2
N2
)
=
4
nL
(
1− 1
N
)2 L∑
i=1
qiCi
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Since the diagonal of each Ci equals 1 all diagonal elements of the covariance
matrix Var[pˆ] equal 4nL (1− 1N )2
∑L
i=1 qi.
Derivation of the variance and covariance entries in table 6. SinceAip = (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
′
for all i, we have
V (Aip) =
1
4
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
=
1
4
(2I − J2,2)
and
A′iV (Aip)Ai =
1
4
(2A′iIAi −A′iJ2,2Ai) =
1
4
(2A′iAi − JN,N ),
and the sum that appears in equation (6) is
L∑
i=1
α3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai =
L∑
i=1
α3
4
(2A′iAi − JN,N )
=
α3
2
L∑
i=1
A′iAi −
α3L
4
JN,N
=
1
2L
A′A− 1
4L2
JN,N .
Putting it all together we get
1
n
(A′A)−1
( L∑
i=1
α3iA
′
iV (Aip)Ai
)
(A′A)−1 =
1
n
(A′A)−1
(
1
2L
A′A− 1
4L2
JN,N
)
(A′A)−1
=
1
n
(
1
2L
(A′A)−1 − 1
4L2
(A′A)−1JN,N (A′A)−1
)
=
1
n
(
MN
(
1− 2(N − 1)
N2
,−N − 2
N2
)
− 1
N2
JN,N
)
=
1
n
MN
(
1− 2N − 1
N2
,−N − 1
N2
)
=
1
n
MN
((
1− 1
N
)2
,− 1
N
(
1− 1
N
))
.
B Entropy calculations: Pair and list method
As stated in Section 2.1 the overall entropy of the distribution of voting inten-
tions is
H[T ] = −ET [log2 pT (T )] = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi.
For the pair method it holds that
pT,R(i, {i, j}) = P(T = i, R = {i, j}) = pi
N − 1
and
pT |R(i | {i, j}) = P(T = i | R = {i, j}) = pi
pi + pj
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for all i 6= j. Further, by using the above it follows that
H[T | R] = −ET,R[log2 pT |R(T | R)] = −
∑
i 6=j
pi
N − 1 log2
pi
pi + pj
(17)
and
I[T ;R] = H[T ]−H[T | R] = −
∑
i 6=j
pi
N − 1 log2(pi + pj). (18)
For the list method, let L◦l denote either L
+
l or L
−
l , and let p
◦
l :=
∑
k∈L◦l pk.
pT,R(i,L
◦
l ) = piαl
if i ∈ L◦l , and
pT |R(i | L◦l ) =
pi
p◦l
.
Thus
H[T | R] = −ET,R[log2 pT |R(T | R)] = −
L∑
l=1
∑
i∈L◦l◦=+,−
piαl log2
pi
p◦l
= H[T ] +
L∑
l=1
αl(p
+
l log2 p
+
l + p
−
l log2 p
−
l ) (19)
and
I[T ;R] = H[T ]−H[T | R] = −
L∑
l=1
αl(p
+
l log2 p
+
l + p
−
l log2 p
−
l ). (20)
Note that for both the pair method and the list method
pT |R(i|r) = pi
pi +
∑
j∈r\{i} pj
For a given i this conditional probability is maximized when the other parties
indicated in the response r have the least possible support, e.g. when i by chance
is paired with the smallest other party in the pair method.
C Jeopardy calculations: Pair and list method
For the pair method P(R = {1, j} | T = 1) = 1N−1 and
P(R = {1, j} | T 6= 1) = P(R = {1, j}, T 6= 1)
P(T 6= 1) =
1
N−1pj
1− p1 ,
so
J({1, j}) = 1− p1
pj
,
and J(r) = 0 when 1 /∈ r. Averaging over the N(N−1)2 possible responses yields
J¯ =
2(1− p1)
N(N − 1)
∑
j 6=1
1
pj
.
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The list method is similar with P(R = L◦l | T = 1) = αl when 1 ∈ L◦l and
P(R = L◦l | T 6= 1) =
P(R = L◦l , T 6= 1)
P(T 6= 1) =
αlP(T ∈ L◦l \ {1})
1− p1
=
αl
1− p1
∑
j∈L◦l \{1}
pj = αl
p◦l − p1
1− p1 .
The jeopardy is thus
J(L◦l ) =
1− p1
p◦l − p1
1{1 ∈ L◦l }
and averaging over all 2L lists and complementary lists we get
J¯ =
1− p1
2L
∑
L◦l :1∈L◦l
1
p◦l − p1
.
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D Tables
In all tables (∗) indicates that the the list method uses all lists with exactly half
of the number of parties each, and each list has equal weight αl. To prevent
double counting, party 1 is always on a list L+ and never on a complementary
list L−.
Swedish election 2014
SD S M MP C V FP KD FI O
pi 0.129 0.310 0.233 0.061 0.069 0.057 0.054 0.046 0.031 0.010
Table 1: Outcome of the Swedish general election from 2014.
General p pi =
1
N (∗)
H[T ] −∑i pi log2 pi log2N
P
a
ir
I[T ;R] −∑i 6=j piN−1 log2(pi + pj) log2N − 1
H[T |R] −∑i6=j piN−1 log2 pipi+pj 1
−maxr log2 pT |R(1|r) − log2 p1 + log2(p1 + minj 6=1 pj) 1
L
is
t
I[T ;R] −∑Ll=1 αl(p+l log2 p+l + p−l log2 p−l ) 1
H[T |R] −∑i pi log2 pi +∑Ll=1 αl(p+l log2 p+l + p−l log2 p−l ) log2N − 1
−maxr log2 pT |R(1|r) − log2 p1 + log2
(
p1 + minl,◦;1∈L◦l
∑
j∈L◦l \{1} pj
)
log2N − 1
Table 2: Entropy related measures. I[T ;R] is the expected amount of di-
vulged information, H[T |R] is the expected amount of retained privacy, and
−maxr log2 pT |R(1|r) is the least possible amount of retained privacy for a re-
spondent with embarrassing opinion (1).
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Swedish election 2014 (∗) pi = 110 (∗)
H[T ] 2.80 3.32
P
a
ir
I[T ;R] 2.06 2.32
H[T |R] 0.74 1.00
−maxr log2 pT |R(1|r) 0.11 1.00
L
is
t
I[T ;R] 0.93 1.00
H[T |R] 1.87 2.32
−maxr log2 pT |R(1|r) 1.07 2.32
Table 3: Entropy related measures — the general Swedish election 2014.
General p pi =
1
N (∗)
P
a
ir J(r)
1−p1
pj
1{1 ∈ r} (N − 1)1{1 ∈ r}
J¯ 2(1−p1)N(N−1)
∑
j 6=1
1
pj
2
(
1− 1N
)
L
is
t J(L◦l )
1−p1
p◦l−p11{1 ∈ L
◦
l } 2(N−1)N−2 1{1 ∈ L◦l }
J¯ 1−p12L
∑
L◦l :1∈L◦l
1
p◦l−p1
N−1
N−2
Table 4: Jeopardy measures.
Swedish election 2014 (∗) pi = 110 (∗)
P
a
ir max J(r) 87.1 9.00
J¯ 4.42 1.80
L
is
t max J(L◦l ) 6.18 2.25
J¯ 1.37 1.13
Table 5: Jeopardy measures — the general Swedish election 2014.
pi =
1
N (∗) Var(pˆi) Cov(pˆi, pˆj)
Pair 2n(N−2) (1− 1N )2 − 2nN(N−2) (1− 1N )
List 1n (1− 1N )2 − 1nN (1− 1N )
Baseline 1nN (1− 1N ) − 1nN2
Table 6: Variance and bias relations. The values for the pair method are from
Theorem 1 and the list expressions are deduced in Appendix A.
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E Figures
Figure 1: Standard deviation for the estimate of a party’s support as a function
of sample size in the case of equal true supports pi = 10% for i = 1, . . . , 10.
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Figure 2: Standard deviation for the estimate of Sweden Democrats’ support as
a function of sample size in the case of true support equal to the 2014 election
(12.9%).
Figure 3: Standard deviation for the estimate of Social Democrats’ support as
a function of sample size in the case of true support equal to the 2014 election
(31.0%).
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Figure 4: Standard deviation for the estimate of minor parties’ support as a
function of sample size in the case of true support equal to the 2014 election
(1%).
Figure 5: Power calculation for bias-detection according to (3) where the total
size of both surveys is n = 15 000 with nList = nPair = 13 500, p = 10%,
N = 10. The confidence level (type I error) used is γ = 5%.
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Figure 6: Power calculation for bias-detection according to (3) where the to-
tal size of both surveys is n = 15 000, with optimised allocation between
the standard binomial survey and the list and the pair method according to
nList = 11 250 and nPair = 9 000, p = 10%, N = 10. The confidence level (type
I error) used is γ = 5%.
Figure 7: Power calculation for bias-detection according to (3) where the total
size of both surveys is n = 15 000 with nList = nPair = 13 500, p = 12.9%
(SD) Swedish election 2014, N = 10. The confidence level (type I error) used is
γ = 5%.
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Figure 8: Power calculation for bias-detection according to (3) where the to-
tal size of both surveys is n = 15 000, with optimised allocation between
the standard binomial survey and the list and the pair method according to
nList = 10 781 and nPair = 8 758, p = 12.9% (SD) Swedish election 2014,
N = 10. The confidence level (type I error) used is γ = 5%.
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